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Abstract
The knowledge-based rational decision model (KBR-model) offers an approach to
rational decision making in a non-probabilistic setting, e.g., in perfect information
games with deterministic payoffs. The KBR-model uses standard game-theoretical
assumptions and suggests following a strategy yielding the highest payoff which the
agent can secure to the best of his knowledge.
In this report, we prove a conjecture by A. Brandenburger that in perfect information games, each KBR-path is a Nash path.
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Introduction

Our model of rational decision making uses standard game-theoretical assumptions, e.g.,
Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate ([6]),
If you cannot rationally expect more than your maximin payoff, always use a
maximin strategy,
and the traditional postulate of rational decision-making:
A rational player chooses a strategy that yields the highest payoff to the best of
his knowledge.
As noted in [1, 2], if a rational player operates in a non-probabilistic setting and bases
his decision on knowledge rather than luck, guesswork, sudden opponent cooperation or
error, etc., the aforementioned postulates lead to the same mathematical model of decision
making that we call the Knowledge-Based Rational decision model (KBR-model).
Though Game Theory often considers decisions based on beliefs rather then knowledge
(cf. [4]), a special theory of knowledge-based decision making looks to be appropriate
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as well. The principal difference between knowledge and belief is the factivity property
of knowledge that beliefs do not necessarily possess. In some situations, players seem
to make decisions on the basis of their knowledge and not merely on their beliefs: military, high-stakes commercial, juridical decisions, etc. Furthermore, according to commonly
accepted properties of knowledge such as positive and negative introspection1 ([5]), the
decision-maker is aware of what he knows and what he does not know and hence is capable of distinguishing what he actually knows from what he merely believes without actual
knowledge.
KBR suggests following a strategy that yields the highest payoff the agent can secure
to the best of his knowledge. Equivalently, within the KBR approach, a rational player
chooses a maximin solution over all strategies of others the player deems possible. These
two seemingly different approaches produce the same result: a maximin choice over the set
of all strategies a player considers possible (i.e., that cannot be ruled out as impossible) is
a strategy yielding the highest guaranteed payoff to the best of that player’s knowledge.
Indeed, let m be the maximin payoff at a given node v over the set of all strategies that a player i considers possible. Then i knows a strategy that guarantees
him payoff m. On the other hand, for any other payoff p > m, i knows that
there is no strategy by i that could guarantee him payoff p. Therefore, m is
the highest payoff that i knows he has a strategy for getting and he cannot
rationally expect a payoff greater than m.
In a somewhat more formal setting, KBR assumes two Rationality Postulates (cf. [1]):
1. A rational player chooses a strategy yielding the highest payoff the agent can secure to
the best of his knowledge. Equivalently, a rational player chooses a maximin solution
over all strategy profiles the player deems possible.
2. Postulate (1) is commonly known and accepted by rational players.
Postulate (1) is the epistemically explicit form of Harsanyi’s Maximin Postulate. Similarly, (2) is merely Harsanyi’s Mutually Expected Rationality Postulate ([6]) expressed in
epistemic language.
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Strategies, profiles, paths

In this paper, we consider generic extensive-form perfect information games which include
specification of the relevant states of knowledge for each player. In particular, for each
player i, it is specified which strategy profiles σ are known to be impossible by player i. All
other profiles are called epistemically possible for player i. By the factivity property of
knowledge, no player is playing a strategy known to be impossible by any of the players.
1

A.k.a. the Axiom of Transparency and the Axiom of Wisdom [7].
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2.1

Simple examples

Consider Game One in Figure 1 in which both players are rational and aware of each
other’s rationality2 . There are two strategies for each player, down or across, which makes
the total number of strategies equal to four:
{downA , downB }, {acrossA , downB }, {downA , acrossB }, {acrossA , acrossB }.

A
•

/•

B





1, 2

0, 0

/ 2, 1

Figure 1: Game One, rationality is commonly known.
Since B is rational, he knows that he is not playing downB . A knows this, concludes that
B is playing acrossB , and rationally decides to play acrossA . Moreover, B knows this as
well. So, in Game One, for each player, the only strategy which is epistemically possible is
{acrossA , acrossB },
which happens to also be the backward induction solution.
Now consider Game Two in Figure 2 on the same game tree as Game One, in which
both players are rational but their rationality is not mutually known. In particular, each
player considers each strategy of the other player possible. B knows that he is playing
A
•

/•

B





1, 2

0, 0

/ 2, 1

Figure 2: Game Two, rationality is not mutually known.
acrossB . The epistemically possible strategy profiles for B are
{downA , acrossB }, {acrossA , acrossB }.
2

Taking into account the length of the game, this is equivalent to assuming the common knowledge of
rationality.
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Player A considers either strategy by B possible and cannot rationally expect to get a
payoff greater than 1 if he plays acrossA . By Rationality Postulate 1, A cannot choose
acrossA . Therefore, for A, the epistemically possible strategy profiles are
{downA , downB }, {downA , acrossB }.
Note that though there is more than one strategy profile epistemically possible for each
player, A and B each have a unique, epistemically possible strategy, namely downA for
A and acrossB for B; we call them KBR-strategies. All uncertainty concerning possible
profiles stems from insufficient information about other players, but each player has a
unique rational strategy of his own under these uncertainties.
The KBR-solution of this game is the strategy profile consisting of KBR-strategies of
individual players. In other words, the KBR-solution is the profile that will actually be
played.
In Game Two the KBR-solution is
{downA , acrossB }
and the KBR-path is
downA .

2.2

Rational player’s view of a perfect information game

In general, we assume the usual understanding of strategies: a player’s strategy specifies
what he does at each of his nodes, if reached (cf. [3]). To render this precise, we need the
notion of a subgame in an epistemic setting.
For each node v of game G, a subgame Gv is determined by the rooted subtree with
root v: epistemically possible strategy profiles for i in Gv are epistemically possible strategy
profiles for i in game G relativized to the nodes from the subtree with root v.
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Figure 3: Subgame Gv of game G.
Lemma 1 [1, 2] At each node of a generic perfect information game, there is a unique
move (called a KBR-move) by the corresponding player that yields the highest payoff that
player can secure to the best of his knowledge (called highest known payoff ).
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Proof. Consider a node v and player i making a move at v. Given epistemically possiblefor-i strategy profiles, there is a unique highest payoff hv which i can secure by one of his
strategies at node v. Note that hv is the unique maximin value over all epistemically possible profiles for player i. Since the game is generic, there is at node v one move for player
i through which he can possibly receive payoff hv ; indeed, a different move will generate a
game path in a subtree which does not contain payoff hv for i at all.
2
Corollary 1 In a generic game with rational players, there is a unique KBR-move at each
node.
Definition 1 A KBR-stategy for a given player i is a collection of KBR-moves at nodes
where i makes a move.
Corollary 2 For each generic game with rational players, there is a unique KBR strategy
profile and players actually play this profile.
These observations lead to the following informal picture of epistemically possible strategy profiles for each rational player A; here B is any player other than A. At a node at
A, unique epistemically possible move
•


B, ‘many’ epistemically possible-for-A moves
•?




 

??
??
??


Figure 4: Strategy profiles that (rational) player A considers possible.
which A makes a move, only the KBR-move is epistemically possible for A. At a node at
which some other player makes a move, A may consider multiple moves as epistemically
possible. All epistemically possible strategy profiles for A are constituted from A’s unique
KBR-strategy σA and strategies by others considered epistemically possible by A.
Corollary 3 [1, 2] The real payoff for each player at a given node is greater than or equal
to the highest known payoff at this node.

2.3

Pure maximin and backward induction solution

Pure maximin strategy for a given player i corresponds to the reading of a game in which
i has no information whatsoever about other players’ epistemic states. Then i considers
all moves by opponents epistemically possible. Under these conditions, pure maximin is a
special case of KBR.
Another special case of the KBR-solution is given by the backward induction solution
BI under Aumann’s conditions of common knowledge of rationality ([3]). In this case, each
5

player has sufficient information to exactly determine his opponents’ move at each node.
For each player, there is only one epistemically possible strategy profile: the KBR-solution
of the game.

2.4

A subpath of a KBR-path is a KBR-path as well

Each strategy profile σ determines a unique path P associated with σ: P starts at the root
node and moves according to σ.
It follows from the definition of a subgame that for each player, epistemically possible
profiles in game G and its subgame Gv coincide on nodes from Gv . This observation leads
to the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let G be an extensive-form perfect information game, P be a KBR-path in G,
and v be a node in P . Then the part Pv of P starting from v is the KBR-path of the
subgame Gv in which v is the root node.
We refer the reader to Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Subpath of a KBR-path.
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Each KBR-path is Nash

In this section, we prove a conjecture by A. Brandenburger, stated in a private communication, that in perfect information games with rational players, each KBR-path is a Nash
path. A path P is Nash iff there is a Nash strategy profile σ such that P is the σ-path.
This result enables us to compare KBR with such classical decision-making methods as
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies IESDS, Nash Equilibria NE, and the
backward induction solution BI (cf. discussion in Section 4).
We first observe that the (unique) KBR strategy profile for a generic PI game is not
necessarily a Nash profile. A KBR-player plays to the best of his knowledge, which may
6

be limited: there might be better moves unknown to him. Consider Game Two in Figure
2. The KBR strategy profile is
σ = {downA , acrossB },
and the KBR-path is
P = downA .
It is easy to see that σ is not a Nash profile, since A can unilaterally improve his payoff by
playing across. Indeed, the strategy profile will then be
σ 0 = {acrossA , acrossB }
and the path
P 0 = (acrossA , acrossB )
that yields A’s payoff 2.
On the other hand, there is a Nash strategy profile
σ 00 = {downA , downB }
that has the same path P as σ.
Theorem 1 In a PI game with rational players, the KBR-path is a Nash path.
Proof. Induction on maximal game length n(G). The base: n(G)=1. Then the KBR-path
consists of one rational move which constitutes a Nash profile.
The Induction Hypothesis: suppose the theorem claim holds for all games with length
less than k.
The Induction Step. Consider a PI game G in an extensive tree-like form such that
n(G) = k. Let P be its KBR-path, A be the player who is making a move at root node r,
and 1, . . . , m be immediate successors to r. By G1 , . . . , Gm , we denote subgames of G with
roots at 1, . . . , m respectively.
Let b be the highest known payoff for player A at root node r (cf. [1]), i.e., the highest
payoff that A knows he can secure at r:
b = HKPA (r).
Then for any strategy σA by A, there is a strategy profile σ containing σA and epistemically
possible for A such that A’s payoff of σ, UA (σ) is less than or equal to b. By Corollary 3,
A’s payoff on path P , UA (P ) is greater than or equal to b.
Without loss of generality, assume that A’s root move is (r, 1), and that the rest of P , P1
occurs within G1 . By Lemma 2, P1 is the KBR-path in G1 . By the Induction Hypothesis,
since n(G1 ) < k, P1 is a Nash path in G1 , i.e., there is a Nash strategy profile σ 1 such that
P1 is its path in G1 .
7
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Figure 6: Game G
Our goal now is to extend σ 1 to a Nash strategy profile σ for all of G without changing
its path P . For this, we have to define the moves of each player at nodes other than those
from G1 .
At root node r, A’s move is (r, 1) as suggested by P : make it part of σ. It now remains
to define moves at all nodes of games G2 , . . . , Gm .
Pick subgame Gi , i = 2, . . . , m and consider the following auxiliary ‘maximin game’ on
the same tree. In this maximin game, player A tries to win more than his highest known
payoff b, and all other players are playing against this goal. Label a leaf S (for Success) if
A’s payoff at this leaf is greater than b, and F (for Failure) otherwise. Backward induct
to label all other nodes of Gi and define moves for each node v of Gi .
Case 1. A makes a move at node v, and all immediate successors to v are labeled F.
Then label v as F and pick an arbitrary move for A at v.
Case 2. A makes a move at node v, and there is an immediate successor to v that
is labeled S. Then label v as S and pick a move for A from v to one of its immediate
S-successors.
Case 3. A player other than A makes a move at v, and there is an immediate successor to
v labeled F. Then label v as F and pick a move from v to one of its immediate F-successors.
Case 4. A player other than A is making a move at v, and all immediate successors to
v are labeled S. Then label v as S and pick an arbitrary move at v.
i
Let us denote σAi the strategy by A, and σ−A
the collection of strategies by all other
players in the maximin game on Gi .
The following lemma shows that A cannot win the maximin game.
Lemma 3 The root node i of Gi is labeled F.
Proof. Since b is the highest known payoff for A at the root node, given σAi , there should
i
be a collection δ−A
of strategies for other players in Gi (deemed possible by A) such that
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i
i
A’s payoff of the profile {σAi , δ−A
} is less than or equal to b. Let P 0 be the path of {σAi , δ−A
}
in Gi . We claim that each node of P 0 is labeled F. Backward induction on the length of
P 0 . The leaf of P 0 is labeled F since it indicates A’s payoff on P 0 which is not greater
than b. Consider a node v of P 0 whose immediate successor in P 0 is labeled F. If v is an
A-node3 , all immediate successors to v in Gi are labeled F, hence v is labeled F. If v is a
non-A-node4 , v is labeled F as well. So all nodes of P 0 are labeled F, including the root
node i of Gi .
2
Now we define the desired strategy profile σ on Gi -nodes:
i
For each i = 2, . . . , m, σ restricted to Gi -nodes coincides with {σAi , σ−A
}.

This concludes the construction of σ and it remains to be shown that
1. σ’s path is P ;
2. σ is a Nash profile in game G.
Item (1) is obvious, since the first move of σ is (r, 1) and the rest of the path is P1 .
Lemma 4 σ is a Nash strategy profile.
Proof. Present σ as a collection of A’s strategy σA and non-A-strategies σ−A .
Players other than A cannot improve their payoff by unilaterally deviating from σ−A
given σA . Indeed, changes outside G1 do not alter the outcome. Changes inside G1 cannot
improve the payoff since within G1 , σ is a Nash strategy profile.
Fix σ−A and consider an arbitrary strategy σA0 for A.
Case 1. The first move of σA0 is (r, 1). Then the consequences of σA0 are limited to
changes in A’s strategy within G1 that cannot yield a better payoff for A, since σ is a Nash
profile on G1 .
Case 2. The first move of σA0 is (r, i) with some i = 2, . . . , m. Suppose, en route to
contradiction, that
U ({σA0 , σ−A }) = b0 > b
and let P 0 be the path in Gi corresponding to {σA0 , σ−A }. By backward induction on the
node depth, we show that all nodes of P 0 are labeled S. Base: the leaf node of P 0 is labeled
S since P 0 delivers A’s payoff b0 > b. Let v be a node in P 0 whose immediate successor in
P 0 is labeled S. If v is an A-node, then v should be labeled S by definition of the labeling
process. If v is a non-A-node, then P 0 ’s move at v is made according to σ, which indicates
that all immediate successors to v in Gi are labeled S, hence v is labeled S as well.
We have arrived at a contradiction to Lemma 3 that states i is labeled F. This proves
Lemma 4.
2
3
4

I.e, A is making a move at v.
I.e., some player other than A is making move at v.
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2

This completes the proof of Theorem 1.

As an easy corollary to this theorem, we conclude that each backward induction path
is a Nash path. Indeed, apply Theorem 1 to the variant of the game in which common
knowledge of rationality is assumed. For such games, the resulting BI-path will be the
KBR-path. By Theorem 1, this path is Nash. Likewise, each pure maximin path is Nash
as well, since the maximin profile is the KBR-profile with players ignorant of each others’
rationality.
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Discussion

It follows easily from definitions that in PI games, KBR strategy profiles survive iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS). The backward induction solution
BI operates under the common knowledge of rationality assumption (cf. [3]). The pure
maximin solution MAXM is justified for players ignorant of each other’s rationality. Both
BI and MAXM are special cases of KBR, which lacks such limitations. These observations,
together with Theorem 1, suggest that major methods such as IESDS, Nash Equilibria NE,
BI, MAXM, and KBR are compatible. However, only KBR always produces a justified
unique solution (for generic games). IESDS and NE may be regarded as nondefinitive
approximations to KBR.
For example, consider Game Two in Figure 2. None of the strategies is strictly dominating, hence the IESDS strategy profiles here are
{downA , downB }, {acrossA , downB }, {downA , acrossB }, {acrossA , acrossB }.
There are two NE strategy profiles
{downA , downB } and {acrossA , acrossB },
and two NE-paths
downA and (acrossA , acrossB ).
As always, there is a unique KBR strategy profile, that coincides here with the MAXM
profile:
{downA , acrossB },
and one KBR-path that happens to be the MAXM-path as well:
downA .
There is one BI-path
(acrossA , acrossB ),
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that is also the KBR-path in a version of Game One in which common knowledge of
rationality of players is assumed.
Some correlations between methods can be seen in this example: all NE-profiles are
IESDS-profiles and the BI-path, MAXM-path, and KBR-path are all NE-paths.
Figure 7 illustrates relationships between the aforementioned solution sets (ovals) and
paths (bullets). Ovals represent sets of IESDS- and NE-paths, respectively. Bullets represent the BI-path, MAXM-path, and KBR-path.
$
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'
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Figure 7: Comparing methods

The empty bullets are a reminder that MAXM- and BI-paths are justified only under
special conditions, e.g., complete ignorance of each others’ rationality (MAXM), or common
knowledge of rationality (BI). The arrows indicate that under corresponding conditions,
the MAXM-path and BI-path become the KBR-path.
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